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Abstract. With the growing number of smartcard applications there
comes an increasing need to restrict access to the card itself. In previous
work we proposed the pressure sequence biometric, within which a bio-
metric sensor is integrated onto the card in a low-cost and mechanically
compliant manner. Using an off-card verifier we demonstrated reason-
able discrimination between users. In this paper we consider a number of
on-card verification schemes, the best of which offers an equal error rate
of 2.3%. On-card computational time requirements were found to be 3.1
seconds for enrolment and 0.12 seconds for verification. Incorporating
our implementation into an existing applet used 684 bytes of program
space. Whilst data memory requirements are estimated to be 1400 and
300 bytes for enrolment and verification, respectively. These time and
size requirements demonstrate our biometric as a practical proposition
for the protection of smart cards. Experiments were performed with the
iButton’s Java Card platform.
1 Introduction
In the rapidly growing world of the Internet and e-Commerce, smartcards of-
fer the potential to protect data. This illustrates just one of the functions of a
smartcard driving the motivation to protect and secure access to the smartcard
itself. A number of schemes have been proposed whereby some device external
to the smart card captures a biometric quantity, which is subsequently verified
on a smartcard platform [19]. Off-card sensors suffer from the limitation that
the external biometric device must be both present and trusted. This is hard to
achieve [7]. In earlier work [8] we proposed the pressure sequence method, a novel
biometric, which is both mechanically and economically compliant for incorpo-
ration onto the smartcard itself. In this paper we report on the implementation
of enrolment and verification functions of our biometric on Dallas Semiconduc-
tor’s iButton Java Card platform [18], thereby demonstrating the viability of
our biometric from the perspective of available computational resources.
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The pressure sequence method measures the differences with which a user
taps a sequence, or rhythm, upon a simple polymer pressure sensor. The recog-
nition of people from a series of taps or pulses has some precedent. For example
early telegraphic operators recognised other operators by the way in which they
keyed information. Operators developed a distinctive ’fist’ or telegraphic style
that could be recognised [4]. Indeed much work has been reported on the use of
a person’s typing style, or keystroke dynamics [9], as a route to identity verifi-
cation. Rumelhart and Norman [17] offer an explanation for the discriminating
basis of keystroke dynamics, suggesting that differences in typing style are due
to both the physical characteristics of the hand - such as finger length and agility
- and the level of motor control of a person.
The pressure sequence method seeks recognition by the pattern of pressure
pulses between fingertip and pressure sensor, resulting to some measure from the
biomechanical characteristics of a person’s hand and wrist. The human hand is
complex and offers scope for discrimination between people. This is demonstrated
in its composition of 19 bones, 19 joints and 20 muscles, combining to give 22
degrees of freedom [11].
For the pressure sequence method to gain merit as a verifier, a high level of
discrimination must be demonstrated. Since there are strong similarities between
the pressure sequence method and that of keystroke dynamics, the discrimina-
tion methods of keystroke dynamics have been investigated for their potential
to discriminate between people, based only on a sequence of taps on a single
pressure sensor. This is justified in that both result from similar neurophysio-
logical and biomechanical mechanisms and that, at a minimum, both consider
time intervals between finger taps.
2 Experimental Method
To validate the pressure sequence biometric, 34 students and staff from the Elec-
tronics and Computer Science department in Southampton participated in an
experiment. Each volunteer was asked to choose a short tapping sequence (typ-
ically lasting between 2 and 4 seconds), and to tap that rhythm 30 times. Data
collection from each volunteer was collected in one single session in a supervised
manner at all times. For further details see our earlier work [8]. Figure 1 shows
the analogue waveform of a pressure sequence. It is with these macro features;
Pulse Heights, Pulse Widths and Interval Durations, that the pressure sequence
method aims to discriminate between a valid and an invalid user. A feature ex-
traction algorithm was devised to pre-process the analogue waveform, generating
a single column feature vector comprising of (PulseHeight(1), PulseWidth(1), In-
tervalDuration(1) , ..... , IntervalDuration(n-1), PulseHeight(n), PulseWidth(n)),
where n is the number of pulses in a sequence. Table (1) represents the sequence
presented in figure 1 as a feature vector.
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Fig. 1. Unprocessed Pressure Sequence
Table 1. Corresponding Feature Vector
Pulse1 Pulse1 Interval1 Pulse2 Pulse2 . . . . . . Interval7 Pulse8 Pulse8
Height Width Duration Height Width Duration Height Width
52.13 115.63 215.5 36.5 105.38 . . . . . . 246.5 48.25 129.38
3 System Architecture
The pre-processing of raw pressure sequence data occurs within a separate bio-
metrics module, comprising of analogue to digital conversion block, alongside
feature extraction circuitry. We envisage this module being implemented in a
small piece of silicon providing the interface between the analogue sensor and
the smartcard’s processor. Figure 2 outlines this architecture. This implies that
the smartcard’s processor will only be presented with the feature vector rep-
resentation of the pressure sequence, and will not be required to monitor live
real-time data.
Fig. 2. Biometric System Schematic
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This paper assess the viability of using a standard processor for much of
the hard work; future work will be to assess the integration of the electron-
ics comprising the biometrics module; for example signal conditioning circuitry,
analogue to digital conversion unit and how to protect the wiring on the card.
4 Verification Schemes
A number of authors have reported on the successful use of keystroke dynamics
as a route to identification verification [20,14,2,10,1,3,13,16,12,6,21]. The process
of verification is essentially the comparison of a live biometric sample to a stored
reference template, calculated during the process of enrolment. If the live sample
is sufficiently close to the stored reference, then the user’s identity will be con-
sidered valid. If not, the user will be rejected and denied access to the services
or facilities on offer. Due to the similarities, in terms of hand physiology and
motor control, responsible for underlying mechanisms of both keystroke dynam-
ics and the pressure sequence method, successful keystroke verification schemes
have been assessed (in MatLab V5.3) for their success in recognising a pressure
sequences. Table 2 shows our results.
Table 2. Pressure Sequence Error Rates with Verification Scheme
Verification Scheme EER % FRR at 1% FAR
Keystroke Dynamics Reference(s)
1 norm - Fixed Threshold [10] 9.7 80
2 norm - Fixed Threshold [21,3,16] 5 41
Component-Wise Linear [12] 7.2 32
MICD - Fixed Threshold [1] 5.2 37
Component-Wise non-Linear [12,16] 3.7 20
1 norm - User Specific [10] 2.3 10
2 norm - User Specific 3 18
Mahalanobis - Fixed Threshold [16] 3.4 42
Mahalanobis User Specific 2.4 10
MICD - User Specific 2.8 11
Figure 3 shows the effect of the acceptance tolerance on the false acceptance
and false rejection rates, whilst figure 4 plots the false acceptance rate against
the false rejection rate, or the Receiver Operating Curve (ROC), for the 1 norm
Method. This demonstrates the inverse relationship between False Acceptance
Rates (FAR) and False Rejection Rates; as the acceptance threshold for a veri-
fier is tightened, the number of false acceptances decreases. The penalty to pay
is an increase in false rejections. This property allows the designer of a verifica-
tion system the flexibility to match the verifier’s performance with the security
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requirements of an application. The third column in table 2 shows the false re-
jection penalties incurred in tightening the acceptance threshold to allow only
1% false acceptances.
Table 2 shows that the two best verification schemes; namely the user spe-
cific 1 norm and Mahalanobis Distance, demonstrate impressive discrimination
properties. The next section deals with these verifiers in detail, outlining their
implementation on the iButton.
Fig. 3. FAR & FRR with Acceptance
Tolerance
Fig. 4. ROC for L1 Norm with User
Specific Threshold
5 Implementing Verifiers on the Java-Enabled iButton
A self-contained verification system embedded onto a smartcard must be capa-
ble of performing both the enrolment and verification of a user in a reasonable
time. We accept one-off enrolment times of a few seconds, and per-transaction
verification times of less than one second. To test the suitability of our verifica-
tion schemes, all 10 schemes above have been translated to Java and executed
on a Dallas Semiconductor Java-Enabled iButton [18]. The iButton was cho-
sen as a test-platform, being comparable to the latest generation Java-Powered
smartcards, in terms of both processing and memory resources, whilst offer-
ing accessible simulation and debug facilities. Applets were compiled using Sun
Microsystem’s JDK2.1.1 under version 1.10 of Dallas Semiconductor’s iButton
Development environment (iB-IDE). The resulting Java-Code was run on the
JavaCard 2.0 compliant Java-Virtual-Machine (JVM) of the iButton. The enrol-
ment and verification functions of each verifier were implemented in a skeletal
applet, containing basic functionality to allow PC Host to iButton communica-
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tion and the timing of enrolment and verification functions. The structure of our
test applet is as follows:
• Retrieve and store pre-processed enrolment vectors from PC
• Record start time
• Perform enrolment (a number of times)
• Record finish time
• Send total enrolment time and reference vector to PC
Verification times were measured in the same way as enrolment times, with
the verification function called in place of enrolment. Times were recorded using
the iButton’s real time clock, which has a resolution of only 1 second. The ap-
plet executes by firstly loading a user’s enrolment feature vectors, pre-processed
from their enrolment sequences, to the iButton. The enrolment process is then
repeated a number of times. Time is recorded using the iButton’s clock value,
before and after a number of calls to the enrolment process. From these val-
ues an average execution time is calculated. Total time required, along with the
computed reference vector, is transmitted to the Host PC. Implementing the
process in this way avoids lengthy PC to iButton communications which are not
involved in the enrolment (or verification process). This simulation assumes that
the enrolment samples have already been captured, pre-processed, and are now
available to the processor. Data capture and feature extraction pre-processing is
the responsibility of the biometrics module, outlined in figure 2.
5.1 Specific Implementation Issues
There are two fundamental limitations to running our verifiers on the JavaCard
platform; the restriction to 32-bit integers and hence the lack of floating-point
data-types; and the lack of elementary mathematical functions, such as square-
roots.
The fixed threshold version of one of the most successful verification schemes,




|mi − ti| (1)
where M is the d dimensional reference-vector, generated from the mean of each
of the components in the user’s enrolment vectors, T is a d dimensional test
vector, and m and t are the components of M and T respectively.
The identity of a user will be accepted if:
‖M−T‖1 ≤ θ (2)
where θ is the acceptance threshold.
Calculation of the 1 norm is achievable with no loss of precision under the
restriction of the 32-bit integer data type. Using a fixed acceptance threshold,
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however, resulted in a rather uninspiring equal error rate (EER) of 9.7% (see
Table 2), since the same acceptance threshold is used for all users irrespective
of their natural variance.
To improve upon this rate, the variation of a user’s enrolment vectors from
their reference vector can be taken into account. This is performed in the manner
of Joyce [10]. If each of the enrolment vectors are S1, S2, . . . , Sn, respectively,
then the 1 norm between the reference vector,M and Sj is calculated for j = 1 to
the number of enrolment vectors. The mean deviation DEnrolment, and standard
deviation, σEnrolment, of these distances are calculated and used to decide an
acceptance threshold on a per user basis. This results in acceptance of the user’s
identity if:
‖M−T‖1 ≤ |DEnrolment − τ · σEnrolment| (3)
where τ is the globally-set acceptance tolerance.
The problem for the integer-only Java Card system is that calculation of
σEnrolment, the standard deviation of the distance between enrolment vectors





Whilst the immediately obvious method for calculation of square roots, the
Newton-Raphson method [15], is well known and used, it suffers from a number
of problems. Firstly, it is an iterative method, whose efficiency depends upon the
quality of the initial guess. Secondly, applied to integers in its native form, the
Newton-Raphson method will infinitely oscillate between two integers, above and
below a real non-integer root [5]. Crenshaw [5] has devised a simple algorithm
for the calculation of square roots. His method is essentially a search through all
possible integers until the integer part of a non-integer root is found. The sim-
plest form of this is to search all possible integer square roots, x, for
√
N until
x2 ≥ N . The integer root of N is then the exit value of x, minus one. Crenshaw
provides a more efficient implementation, arising from the observation:
(x+ 1)2 = x2 + (2x+ 1) (5)
This means that to check each new possible square root, (2x + 1) merely has
to be added to the previous square. The Java code implementation for this is
presented as follows:
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Java Code for Integer Square Root Function
public static int SQRT(int a) {
int square = 1; // x=1: 1st Integer Square Root
int delta = 3; // (2x+1), for x=1
while(square<=a) {
square+=delta; // (x+1)^2 = x^2 + (2x+1)
delta +=2; // Next value for (2x+1)
}
return (delta/2 - 1); // square is now > a, so find
// previous value of x
}
Although faster fixed cycle-length square root functions exist [5], the time
required for execution of the enrolment process using this implementation was
measured to be 3.1 seconds - well within the bounds of a reasonable duration.
20 square roots were required for the enrolment process, each iterating 49 times.
Verification required only 0.12 seconds for completion.
Although the final values for the mean distance and its standard deviation
between enrolment vectors and the user’s reference vector will be truncated to
integer levels, the fractional loss is small relative to the distances involved and is
not expected to cause any significant reduction in the verifier’s accuracy. Table 3,
presenting the floating point and integer results from one user, illustrates this
point.
Table 3. Comparison of Floating Point and Integer Results
. . . Mean Distance Standard Deviation
Floating Point Result 221 49.29
iButton’s Integer Result 222 48
The second most discriminating method; the Mahalanobis distance verifier
is defined as follows:
(M−T) ·V−1 · (M−T) ≤ |DEnrolment − τ · σEnrolment| (6)
where M, T, DEnrolment, τ and σEnrolment are as defined in (1) and (3), above.
V−1 is defined as the inverse of a square d× d matrix whose leading diagonal is
composed of the variances from each dimension of the enrolment vectors and all
other elements are zero.
This leads us to the problem that multi-dimensional arrays are not supported
under Java Card 2.0, and as a result matrix manipulation will be both convoluted
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and time consuming. The solution rests with the analytical reduction of the left-
hand side of (6) to give:






where vi is the variance of the component of the enrolment vectors. Equation (7)
now offers a route to the direct computation of the Mahalanobis distance verifier.
There is one further catch, however. vi as the variance of each vector component,
is the square of the standard deviation for that component. It is hence likely
to be of comparable magnitude to that of the component values. The integer
division, therefore, of (mi− ti)2 by vi is extremely likely to result in the loss of a
significant fractional part of the result, further compounded by the sum across
all components. Pre-multiplying each numerator by 10RequiredPrecision and post-
dividing the sum by the same enables retention of the fractional information.
Table (4) provides the floating point, the integer and the pre-multiplied integer
results.
Table 4. Comparison of Floating Point, Integer and Pre-Multiplied Integer
Results
. . . Mean Distance Standard Deviation
Floating Point Result 17.5 5.56
iButton’s Integer Result 10 4
iButton’s Pre-Multiplied Integer Result 17 5
Execution of the Mahalanobis enrolment process required 4.5 seconds, whilst
verification required 0.16 seconds.
5.2 Further Results
The enrolment and verification times for the other verification schemes were also
measured on the iButton. In addition the program size for enrolment and ver-
ification functions, combined was recorded. Table (5) presents a comparison of
these quantities, along with a repetition of the Equal Error Rates, for conve-
nience.
6 Conclusions
The Java Card 2.0 platform does not support floating-point arithmetic. We show
that 32-bit integer arithmetic offered by the iButton implementation of Java
Card 2.0 is sufficient to implement on-card verification and enrolment for our
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Table 5. Results for all Verifiers
Enrolment Verification Program
Verification Scheme Time Time Size EER%
(Seconds) (Seconds) (bytes)
1 norm - Fixed Threshold 1.2 0.12 296 9.7
2 norm - Fixed Threshold 1.2 0.26 356 5
Component-Wise Linear 1.2 0.19 285 7.2
MICD - Fixed Threshold 1.2 0.15 319 5.2
Component-Wise Non-Linear 2.9 0.29 524 3.7
1 norm - User Specific 3.1 0.12 684 2.3
2 norm - User Specific 4.2 0.25 707 3
Mahalanobis - Fixed Threshold 2.4 0.16 550 3.4
Mahalanobis User Specific 4.5 0.16 752 2.4
MICD - User Specific 8.5 0.16 704 2.8
pressure sequence biometric. We develop the necessary mathematics and esti-
mate the errors introduced by representing real data as integer data.
We measure the execution times and space requirements required by our
implementation of verification and enrolment and show that they are within
reach for a typical Java Card platform.
We present an architecture for a complete on-card pressure sequence biomet-
ric. In a previous paper we presented a method of integrating the physical sensor
the plastic substrate of the smart card. In this paper we show that the process-
ing capabilities required can be provided by a standard smart card. Future work
includes an investigation into integrating the analogue electronics and the wiring
on a standard smart card.
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